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Abstract
Consumers have only partial knowledge before making a purchase decision, but can choose
to acquire more detailed information. A rm can make it easier or harder for these consumers to
obtain such information. We explore consumersinformation gathering and the rms integrated
strategy for marketing, pricing, and investment in quality. In particular, we highlight that when
consumers are ex-ante heterogeneous, the rm might choose an intermediate marketing strategy
for two quite di¤erent reasons. First, it serves as a non-price means of discrimination it can
make information only partially available, in a way that induces some, but not all, consumers to
acquire the information. Second, when the rm cannot commit to a given investment in quality,
it can still convince all consumers of its provision by designing a pricing and marketing policy
that induces some consumers to actively gather further information. This mass of consumers,
in exchange, is su¢ ciently large to discipline the monopolist to invest in the quality of the
product.
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1 Introduction
Before deciding whether to buy a good or service, consumers often have the opportunity to gather
information or simply spend time thinking about how much they would enjoy the good. Gathering or
processing information is costly, in terms of money, time and e¤ort. A rm, through its advertising,
product design, and marketing strategies, can a¤ect these costs and make it easier or harder for
consumers to assess whether a product is a good match for their needs or preferences. In this paper,
we explore a monopolist rms marketing strategy by characterizing the rms choice of how costly
it is for consumers to learn their valuations of the good. The marketing decision, of course, interacts
with the rms investment in quality and its pricing decision.
To take a specic example, a rm selling software determines prices and how much to invest in
development. It can also choose how easy it is for customers to gure out their valuation for the
software before they purchase it: The rm could simply list or advertise some of the applications
and features; it could, additionally, illustrate these through describing the performance in standard
tasks; or it could even allow trial versions that permit potential consumers to try the product for a
period. Consumers initially have some idea of how much the software might be worth to them, but
the access to additional information would allow them to research further, revise their opinions,
and attain a more precise valuation of the software.
If consumers could fully inspect the good, they would still perceive it di¤erently, due to idiosyn-
cratic taste di¤erences. From the rms perspective, making it easier for consumers to learn their
valuations will have the positive e¤ect that some of them will be willing to pay a relatively high
price when they learn that the product is a good match for them; but, also, the negative e¤ect
that some others learn that the product is a bad match and their willingness to pay is accordingly
reduced.
When consumers are ex-ante identical in their expectations about the good, this trade-o¤ re-
solves itself to one extreme or the other. Either the rm prefers to make it impossible for consumers
to learn their valuations, choosing an opaque policy, and sells with probability one at the average
valuation, or else it chooses a transparent policy and sells to those with high realized valuation at
high prices. This is precisely the trade-o¤between a broad, full-market strategy or a niche-targeting
one. Similar considerations have been described, for example, in Lewis and Sappington (1994) and
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Johnson and Myatt (2006).2 Further, it can readily be shown that if marginal costs of production
are higher, the costless information (niche) strategy is more likely to be preferred.
However, if consumers are ex-ante heterogeneous (if a good match is worth more to some con-
sumers than others), the rm might prefer an intermediate information strategy. In this case, some
consumers choose to get informed, while others prefer to buy without getting informed. Indeed,
the rm might prefer an intermediate information strategy even if, when dealing with each type
separately, it would use the same extreme policy. In particular, a rm might pursue the same
marketing strategy in two di¤erent markets, but, following integration of these markets, choose a
di¤erent strategy for the combined market.
This result can arise for two di¤erent reasons. First, the rms marketing strategy is integrated
with its pricing strategy; therefore, when dealing with ex-ante heterogeneous consumers, an in-
termediate marketing strategy can act as a non-price means of discriminating between di¤erent
consumer types. Highly interested consumers prefer to buy immediately, without any extra in-
formation, while less interested consumers buy only after having checked for quality. Second, an
intermediate marketing strategy can also serve as an indirect form of commitment to provide qual-
ity. When some consumers verify the quality of the good and buy conditional on what they observe,
they implicitly act as monitors for the rest of the consumers, who can buy without assessing. In
other words, those assessing give the rm su¢ ciently strong incentives to invest in quality, even
when this investment is not directly observable. This is important, for example, in the case of a
new rm without an established reputation for the quality of its product.
We are able to illustrate these two considerations in a fairly general model. We then move on
to examine a particular specication of the model in which tastes are linear functions of consumer
types, types are distributed uniformly, and investment in quality is a discrete decision. Within
this structure, the mechanisms at work can be observed easily. Furthermore, we prove that an
established rm that can commit to a level of investment in quality is more likely to choose an
intermediate marketing strategy when high-value consumers are relatively insensitive to the idio-
syncratic match quality.
Our approach and discussion complement some recent work on the economics of advertising that
is in contrast to much of the earlier literature (see Bagwell, 2007, for an excellent and thorough
2See, also, Creane (2008) for a recent and interesting application of this intuition.
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survey). In particular, we explain the diversity of advertising and marketing strategies by focusing
on the informational content of advertising and its strategic use. We abstract from the more tradi-
tional views of advertising as a costly signaling device, or that advertising enters into preferences
directly. Closest in terms of the question and model of this paper is Zettelmeyer (2000); however,
there, the primary concern is competition, and so the model makes some restrictions in other re-
spects. In particular, it assumes that customers are identical ex-ante; as a consequence, with a
monopoly provider, agents never pay to gather information in equilibrium, in contrast to a central
result and intuition in our paper. Further, Zettelmeyer does not consider the rms commitment
to investment another central concern of our work. Anderson and Renault (2006) show that an
intermediate information policy can often be optimal in a model in which consumers are passive,
in the sense that they take no active information gathering role. In their setup, the optimality
of intermediate information relies on overcoming the holdup associated with the costs of going to
the store (the Diamond paradox) and so arises through a very di¤erent channel from the one we
discuss. Johnson and Myatt (2006) also consider information provision to consumers, but work with
an aggregate demand function, and, so, do not consider individual consumersdecisions and cannot
identify many of the mechanisms that we discuss. Anand and Shachar (2005) consider the role of
advertising in a¤ecting a consumers beliefs about match quality both theoretically and empirically.
Sun (2007) examines how the extent of (known) vertical quality a¤ects a rms decision to release
information about horizontal attributes. Finally, in related work, Bar-Isaac, Caruana, and Cuñat
(2008) explore a multidimensional good setting in which consumers also gather information, but
do so attribute by attribute. The study suggests that rms have strong incentives to inuence the
consumersassessment behavior.
Outside of the literature on branding and advertising, our work is related to Courty and Li (1999,
2000), in which the information that consumers have about their valuation for a good increases
(exogenously) over time. A rm can exploit this by charging di¤erent prices at di¤erent times or can
o¤er a menu of refund contracts. Their work nicely characterizes the impact and the comparative
statics of di¤erent information structures for the consumer types. Our work di¤ers from this and
other work on information disclosure, in a number of respects. First, and most signicantly, we
allow no discrimination through prices: There is only one contracto¤ered and all products are
sold at an identical price. Second, our consumers are active in information gathering: They choose
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whether or not to incur a cost in learning their valuations and the rm chooses this cost directly.3 ;4
2 Base Model
We consider a rm that decides: (i) how much to investment in quality for a single good; (ii)
the price of the good; and (iii) the ease with which consumers can learn their valuations for it.
Consumers have expectation of how much they are likely to value the good based on how much
the rm has invested or, in the case where the rm cannot commit to a given quality provision, on
their inferences of how much the rm has invested. Consumersvaluation of the good depends on
their type and an idiosyncratic component. We model investment in quality as leading to a product
that is more likely to appeal to a broader range of consumers of any type. By incurring some e¤ort
that depends on the rms marketing strategy, a consumer can learn her realized valuation before
deciding whether or not to buy.
For the time being, we suppose that investment is observed by consumers, and later, in Section
5 ,we consider the case in which it is not. The specic timing is, therefore, as follows. First, the
rm decides on marketing, price, and investment strategy. Consumers observe all these choices and
decide whether to acquire more information on the product and, subsequently, whether to buy it.
2.1 Firm
A monopoly produces a single product incurring a production cost c(q) to obtain q units. The
product can be a good or a bad match for each consumer, and this is determined stochastically.
The rm can invest a variable amount x to a¤ect the probability that its product becomes a good
match for consumers. In particular, any consumer has a probability of nding a good match of
(x) 2 [0; 1], where  is non-decreasing function.
In addition to choosing its investment strategy, the rm posts a price p for the good, and, cost-
lessly, chooses a marketing strategy A 2 R+.5 Consumers can choose to incur a cost A to learn
the realization of their valuations before buying the good. We will refer to transparency, when the
3There is a wide literature that has considered information gathering and more general price mechanisms. See
Cremer and Khalil (1992), Lewis and Sappington (1997), Cremer et al. (1998a,b), and Bergemann and Välimäki
(2002) or, in the context of auctions, Ganuza and Penalva (2006) and references therein.
4Matthews and Persico (2005) study refund policies but their work is related to this paper inasmuch as they do so
in a framework with information acquisition, and posted prices. Posted prices and fully exible disclosures of partial
information with passive consumers have been also considered in Saak (2006).
5We could also allow A < 0; however, in this model, consumers will choose to get informed if A = 0 and there is
no advantage to further encourage them.
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rm makes it costless for consumers to learn their valuation (A = 0). When the rm makes it pro-
hibitively costly (A =1 or equivalently an A that is high enough so that no consumer veries), we
will refer to it as opacity. Finally, an intermediate marketing strategy corresponds to those interior
choices of A in which some consumers pay to learn the realization of their valuation. Introducing
costs to the rm for choosing di¤erent marketing strategies would be a natural extension; however,
we abstract from it to highlight the economic forces at work.6
Summarizing, the rm in this model is risk-neutral and chooses A, p, and x to maximize its
prots.
2.2 Consumers
There is a mass one of consumers, each of whom is potentially interested in buying one unit of the
good. Consumers have a taste for quality represented by  2 [0; 1], where type, , is distributed
according to some atomless probability density function f(). Higher values of  correspond to
consumers who have higher valuations, on average.
However, the valuation of the good depends not only on ; but also on some ex-ante unknown
idiosyncratic aspect that makes it a good or a bad match for the consumer. The probability that
a match is good is (x).7 The utility of an agent of type  who purchases the good at a price p is
g()   p if it is a good match and b()   p if it is bad. We assume that g()  b() for all  and
that g() and b() are non-decreasing in .
Before purchasing, the agent may decide to assess the quality of the good by spending A. There
is no point in the agent assessing the quality of the good if she plans to buy the good regardless of the
quality level, so assessment will take place only if the subsequent purchase decision is conditional on
nding high quality.8 In particular, assessment is valuable only as a form of protection or insurance
against the possibility of buying a bad match. Therefore, there are only three reasonable strategies
for an agent of type  and the corresponding expected utilities:
 Buy unconditionally without assessing EUB() = g() + (1  )b()  p.
 Buy conditionally after assessing EUA() = (g()  p) A.
6 It is not clear how these costs should change. Providing good and accurate information to consumers is costly;
but it is also costly to deliberately hide and obfuscate information.
7Where there is no ambiguity, we will suppress the argument for (x) and simply write . Note, also, that the
probability of a match is independent of .
8For expositional purposes, and without loss of generality, we assume that, when A = 0, consumers that do not
condition their purchase on what they see do not assess.
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 Not buy (do not assess or buy) EUN () = 0.
3 General Results
First, we focus on consumer strategies, taking the rms strategy as given.
3.1 Characterizing Consumer Behavior
We begin by introducing two lemmas that allow the behavior of every consumer to be described in
a simple way.
Lemma 1 If an agent of type  prefers assessing to buying unconditionally, then so do all agents
of type   .
Proof.  prefers assessing to buying unconditionally and so
(g()  p) A > g() + (1  )b()  p, (1)
which holds if and only if
p  A
1   > b(). (2)
Since b() is non-decreasing in , then condition (2) holds for all   .
Lemma 2 If a consumer of type  prefers not to buy, then all consumers with    also prefer
not to buy.
Proof.  prefers not to buy when
0 > max f(g()  p) A; g() + (1  )b()  pg . (3)
Both arguments of the max are non-decreasing in , and so condition (3) holds for all   .
As a consequence of Lemmas 1 and 2, to characterize consumer behavior, it is su¢ cient to
identify the consumers who are indi¤erent between buying unconditionally and assessing, between
buying unconditionally and not buying, and between assessing and not buying. Consumer strategies
are homogeneous in the intervals determined by such consumers.9 We introduce notation for such
9Note that, in some circumstances, all consumers may have the same strict preferences over some (or all) of these
assessment strategies, so that no consumer is indi¤erent between two of these strategies.
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consumers.
Specically, let TBA denote the consumer indi¤erent between buying unconditionally and as-
sessing. Then, TBA is implicitly dened by EUB(TBA) = EUA(TBA). By Lemmas 1 and 2, there
can be at most one solution. If there is no solution, it is because all consumers prefer one option
over the other. If EUB() > EUA() holds for all , we dene TBA = 0: This is with some abuse,
but has no consequences, as the mass of consumers with  = 0 is zero. When EUB() < EUA()
holds for all , we dene in a similar fashion TBA = 1.
Similarly, we dene TBN as the consumer who is indi¤erent between buying without assessment
and not buying. TBA is implicitly dened by the equation EUB(TBN ) = 0. Again if EUB() > 0
for all  denote TBN = 0; and if EUB() < 0, then TBN = 1. Finally, let TAN denote the consumer
indi¤erent between assessing and not buying, implicitly dened by EUA(TAN ) = 0, and if no
solution exists, denote TAN = 0 if EUA() > 0 and TAN = 1 otherwise.
Note that TBN , TBA and TAN depend on the rms choice of price, p, marketing, A, and
investment (which appears indirectly through ), as well as all exogenous parameters of the model;
however, we often suppress these arguments for notational simplicity. In the case that TBN , TBA
and TAN are interior, then they are implicitly dened as follows:
g(TBN ) + (1  )b(TBN ) = p, (4)
b(TBA) = p  A
1   , (5)
g(TAN ) = p+
A

. (6)
3.2 The Firms Problem
With these denitions and preliminary results, the rms sales can be simply written down as:
S =
Z 1
maxfTBN ;TBAg
f()d + 1TBA>TAN
Z TBA
TAN
f()d, (7)
where 1TBA>TAN is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if TBA > TAN and 0 otherwise. The
rst integral in (7) corresponds to sales to consumers who buy without assessment, and the second
expression corresponds to those who assess and buy only when they nd high quality, which occurs
with probability .
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The rms problem, then, is to choose (A; p; x) in order to maximize prots:
 = pS   c(S)  x, (8)
Note that sales S depend on TBN , TBA and TAN and, therefore, on (A; p; x).
Proposition 3 highlights implications for consumer behavior when the rm optimally chooses an
intermediate marketing strategy that is, 0 < A <1 with some consumers assessing, rather than
either an opaque (A =1) or a transparent (A = 0) one.
Proposition 3 Intermediate marketing is strictly optimal only if, in equilibrium, there are both
consumers who assess, and consumers who buy without assessment.
Proof. Suppose that the rms optimal strategy is to choose some intermediate A 2 (0;1). If all
consumers assess, then the rm can do better by increasing the price, and reducing A accordingly
(thereby inducing identical assessment and purchase behavior). If no one assesses, then the rm
can do no worse by choosing the same price and A =1.
Proposition 3 illustrates one of the two mechanisms outlined in the introduction. It is at the
heart of the idea of using the marketing strategy as a non-price means of discriminating between
di¤erent consumer types. The proposition suggests (and this is veried in examples below) that
the marketing strategy can be protably used as a means of inducing di¤erent consumer types to
behave di¤erently.
All of the above has the following implications.
Corollary 4 When intermediate marketing is strictly optimal, there is some interior threshold TBA
above which all types buy without assessment and lower types assess and, possibly, another threshold
TAN below which consumers do not buy.
Proof. Immediate consequence of Lemmas 1 and 2, and Proposition 3.
Corollary 5 If intermediate marketing is optimal for the rm, there must be variation in the value
of a bad match i.e., b() cannot be constant. In particular, agents must be heterogeneous.
Proof. By Proposition 3, it is necessary that some agents prefer to assess and others buy without
assessment. Suppose that some type  prefers to buy without assessment and some type  prefers to
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assess. Then, as in (2), it must be that p  A1   b() and p  A1  > b(), which would contradict
that b() is constant in .
Another necessary condition for intermediate marketing to be optimal is that b(1) > minq
c(q)
q .
Indeed, if this condition fails, the optimal marketing strategy is either transparency or simply to
make no sales. The intuition is clear: intermediate or opaque marketing strategies allow the rm to
make sales even when matches are bad. However, if bad matches unambiguously destroy surplus,
there is no advantage to making such sales.
Corollaries 4 and 5 contain the main intuition for why intermediate marketing can be used as
a means of non-price discrimination. When intermediate marketing is optimal, there is a mass of
consumers with high ex-ante valuations of the good (consumers with high ) that buys without
assessment. There is also a mass of them with lower ex-ante valuations for the good (lower ) that
assesses and buys only upon nding a good match. Finally, there may be a group that has very
low ex-ante valuations and decides not to assess or buy. The rm is, therefore, using the marketing
strategy as a way to induce consumers with low ex-ante valuations to base their consumption
decision on their ex-post valuations. The rm can sell to those with a good idiosyncratic match
even if their ex-ante valuation is below the price. At the same time, consumers with high ex-ante
valuations remain in the darkand base their purchase on their ex-ante valuations. Some of them
may eventually nd out ex-post that their realized valuation is below the price.10
However, the rm cannot directly discriminate between consumers in terms of information, so
di¤erent assessment behaviors have to be achieved indirectly through the right marketing policy A.
Assessment can be seen as paying a premium A that insures against a bad realization. Therefore,
for some consumers to assess and for some not to, there must be heterogeneity in their valuations
upon a bad match. Given that low valuations are increasing in the type, the rm can select an A
such that high  consumers do not verify, while some low  ones do.
It is important to stress that the results so far are fairly general, as they do not depend on the
particular choice of consumer utility functions or the type distribution. In the following section, we
focus on the family of linear utility functions with uniformly distributed types. This allows us to
write explicit expressions for p and A; and to gain additional intuition about when each marketing
strategy is optimal.
10 In other words, intermediate marketing acts as a broad market strategy with high ex-ante valuation consumers,
while it acts as a niche strategy with low ex-ante valuation ones.
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4 The Linear-Uniform Case
In this section, we make some more-specic assumptions on the model to fully characterize the
equilibrium. We demonstrate that intermediate marketing and discrimination can arise, and we
explore the role of consumerspreferences for these phenomena to happen. Specically, suppose
that c(q) = cq, the distributions of consumers is uniform on [0; 1], and valuations are linear in type
so that b() = b+ s and g() = g + (s+). Suppose, also, that investment is a binary decision
and that  = 12 if the rm makes an investment at cost k and  = 0 otherwise. Note that our
earlier assumptions on b() and g() require that g  b, s  0,  > (b  g) and s+  0.
It is worth noting that  need not be positive; indeed, we contrast the case where  > 0, cor-
responding to high-types being relatively more sensitive to quality (since here, g()  b() increases
in ), and  < 0, so that higher-types are relatively insensitive to quality. Both assumptions are
plausible. For example, one might imagine that higher-income types are both more likely to con-
sume and to have a relatively higher valuation for additional quality. In contrast, if someone has a
greater need, he might have higher willingness to pay but be less sensitive to quality (for example,
a starving person).
The rm wants to maximize prots by choosing (A; p; x). >From Equations (7) and (8), we can
write down the rms prot function (using the assumption that  is uniformly distributed) as:
 = (p  c) [(1 maxfTBN ; TBAg) + (TBA   TAN )  1TBA>TAN ]  k  1invest (9)
Given that the investment decision is binary, we treat each case separately. First, we consider
the (less interesting) case in which the rm makes no investment. Then, the marketing strategy
is irrelevant: consumers never consider assessing, as they have no doubts that the match will
be bad. Thus, we can conclude that TBA = TAN = 0: Using Equation (4), we obtain TBN =
max(min(p bs ; 1); 0) and prots simplify to  = (p  c)(1  TBN ). Depending on the values of the
parameters, the optimal price results in either an interior solution with pNI =
b+c+s
2 and prots
of NI =
(B c+s)2
4s ; or a corner solution of either p

NI = b and 

NI = b   c, or pNI  b + s and
NI = 0 (which is equivalent to not operating and no sales).
Now, we analyze the more interesting case in which the rm invests in quality. We can charac-
terize consumer behavior in terms of the parameters using Equations (4), (5), and (6), as follows:
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TBN =max(min(
2p  g   b
2s+
; 1); 0), (10)
TBA =max(min(
p  b  2A
s
; 1); 0); (11)
TAN =max(min(
2A  g + p
s+
; 1); 0). (12)
These are illustrated in Figure 1 for the intermediate case. Note that by assessing rather than
always buying, an agent saves the cost of paying a price p that is above his valuation (in case of a
low realization). He gains this benet (equal to p b+s) with probability 12 , but must pay a cost A.
Similarly, in assessing rather than never buying, a consumer gains a surplus 12 (g+(s+) p) (by
buying the well-matched product with probability 12 ), which must outweigh the cost of assessment
A (which is always paid) for assessment to be worthwhile.
θ = 0 θ = 1 θ
U
b
g
g+(s+Δ)θ
b+sθ
p
Buy without assessmentAssessNever buy
2A
2A
TBN TBATBN
(g+b)/2+(s+Δ/2)θ
Figure 1: Characterising consumer behavior.
A straight rst-order condition approach to obtain the optimal marketing and price choices
is cumbersome because of the possibility of corner solutions. Thus, we consider di¤erent cases
separately, depending on the choice of marketing. In Appendix A, we fully characterize the optimal
solutions under transparency (A = 0) and opacity (A =1). Each of them is a standard monopolist
problem with a simple linear demand (piece-wise linear in the case of A = 0). Here, we consider
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the intermediate marketing in detail, as this is the case that best provides intuitions. An optimal
intermediate marketing strategy, following Proposition 3, requires 1 > TBA > TAN  0. In this
case, we can rewrite the rms prots from Equation (9) as
Int = (p  c)

1  p  b  2A
s
+
1
2

p  b  2A
s
 max(2A  g + p
s+
; 0)

  k. (13)
When  is positive, this expression is strictly increasing in A, and, thus, it is optimal to increase
A up to an opaque marketing strategy. Meanwhile, when is negative, it is increasing for low values
of A; but when A  12 (g   p), it decreases. Therefore, the optimal marketing choice in this case is
A = 12 (g   p) that is, when TAN = 0. Prots are simplied to Int = (p  c)
h
1  2p g b2s
i
  k,
which leads to an optimal price pInt =
2(s+c)+b+g
4 and 

Int =
(b+b+2(s c))2
16s   k. Note that the
feasibility of this solution requires T  IntBA =
2(s+c) b g
4s =
1
2 +
2c b g
4s 2 (0; 1), which is satised if s
is su¢ ciently high. This discussion, together with Corollary 5, can be summarized in the following
result.
Proposition 6 Intermediate marketing is optimal in the linear-uniform case with observable in-
vestment only if low-type consumers are su¢ ciently sensitive to match quality (s  0) and more
sensitive than high-type consumers ( < 0).
This proposition states that a necessary condition for intermediate marketing to be optimal is
that high-value customers are relatively insensitive to quality ( < 0). Intuitively, when  < 0,
the ex-post valuations induced by an intermediate strategy (that is the value of good matches for
lower types, and average valuations for higher types) might all be fairly similar, so that a single
price allows the monopolist to extract much of the surplus.
Note that assuming a higher or lower sensitivity to quality for high  are both plausible alter-
natives, depending on the setting. For example, if consumers have similar preferences but vary in
income, then wealthier (high-value) consumers are also more sensitive to quality.11 However, one
could also imagine that acionados/extremists are relatively insensitive; for example, a science-
ction fanatic might both have a higher average valuation and be relatively insensitive to quality
compared to an occasional viewer, who would gain only by watching a lm that is a good match.
11This is the standard model of vertical di¤erentiation, as articulated, for example, in Tirole (1988) p.96.
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Comparing alternative marketing strategies. Once one has characterized optimal prots
and feasibility conditions for all the possible di¤erent regimes (intermediate above, and transparent
and opaque in Appendix A), we can compare them and choose the highest feasible prot among
them. Figure 2 illustrates this for a particular choice of parameters. It shows how the optimal
marketing and investment strategies vary with s and c, when b = 1, g = 3,  =  0:5 and k = 0:2.
No Sales No Investment
Transparent
Marketing
Intermediate
MarketingOpaque
Marketing
C
S
Figure 2: Marketing and Investment strategies with observable investment.
First, it is clear that when c increases, the trade-o¤ between higher margin and higher volume
tilts in the direction of increasing margins. This implies that the rm should choose a more trans-
parent marketing strategy. This can also be easily formalized by comparing the derivatives with
respect to c of the prot functions of each of the marketing strategies. For example, when s = 1:5,
then the marketing strategy changes from opaque, to intermediate, to transparent, and, nally, the
rm would make no sales as c increases (a shift up in the graph). Note that in regions where both
s and c are relatively high, in equilibrium, the rm sells a relatively low quantity: since investment
is a xed cost, the rm prefers not to invest. In this case, since s is high, it can still make sales
to high  consumers, but in this region, since consumers are certain of bad matches, the marketing
strategy is irrelevant.
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Fixing c, increasing s increases the dispersion in the valuations of di¤erent types of agents.
As suggested by Corollary 5 and Proposition 6, intermediate marketing is optimal only when s is
su¢ ciently high, so that there is dispersion in valuations of di¤erent types of agent, who, there-
fore, choose di¤erent assessment strategies. Note that while increasing s continues to increase such
dispersion in valuations, for high enough values of s (in particular for s > 2), bad matches for
the highest types are more valuable than good matches for lower types. When s is high enough,
therefore, the rm can discriminate between consumers and induce di¤erent behaviors with a trans-
parent marketing strategy (with the highest type buying regardless of the realized match and lower
types buying only after observing that the match is good); however, for lower s, di¤ering assessment
behavior is possible only with intermediate marketing. Moreover, assessment is a deadweight loss
in this environment. As a result, for high enough values of s, transparent marketing is preferred to
intermediate marketing.
Note that Corollary 5 implies that when consumers are homogeneous, the marketing strategy has
to be extreme (transparent or opaque). If the rm could perfectly discriminate among heterogeneous
consumers, it might choose the same extreme marketing strategy for all of them (albeit with di¤erent
prices). Surprisingly, if the rm were then forced not to discriminate, intermediate marketing could
be optimal.12 As a consequence, a rm that served two markets and employed the same marketing
strategy in each, could choose a di¤erent marketing strategy if these two markets were integrated.
5 Unobserved Investment
So far, we have assumed that consumers directly observe the level of investment. However, some-
times it is not observable, and the rm may not be su¢ ciently established to commit to a given
quality standard through reputation. In this case, consumers that assess and buy conditionally play
an additional role: namely, that they act as quality monitors for those that buy unconditionally.
Marketing can act as a form of indirect commitment: By inducing the right number of consumers
to verify, the rm will invest in quality.
We now adapt the model and suppose that consumers do not observe the rms investment
level. Consumer behavior depends on the actual price and quantity, as above; however, it depends
12When the rm can discriminate, for each , it can choose (i) either an opaque strategy with an optimal p =
b+s+g+(s+)
2
and earn (p  c); or (ii) a transparent one at p = g + (s+) and earn p c
2
. Trivially, if b > c, the
rm prefers an opaque strategy for all types. However, when discrimination is not possible, as can be seen in Figure
2, for example, at c = 0:5 < 1 = b, any marketing strategy (and, in particular, an intermediate one) can be optimal.
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on anticipated (rather than actual) investment. That is, TBN , TBA and TAN will be functions
of (A; p; xe) where xe represents the consumers expectation of rm behavior. In equilibrium,
consumers will accurately anticipate the rms investment.
As in Section 3.2, the rms problem is still to choose A, p and x in order to maximize prots,
which are given by:
 = pS   c(S)  x, (14)
where the sales S depend on TBN , TBA and TAN and through them on (A; p; xe). As already men-
tioned, in equilibrium xe = x. Thus, in equilibrium, it is as if there were an additional incentive-
compatibilityconstraint: The rm must have no desire to choose a di¤erent investment level from
the expected one. Note that the purchase behavior of consumers who buy without assessment (or
regardless of the outcome) and of consumers who never buy are based on expected investment and
are entirely una¤ected by the rms actual investment. The rms actual investment a¤ects only
the purchase of those who assess and condition their purchase on the realization. Thus, to sustain
an investment x, the rm must be optimizing with respect to those who are assessing:
x = argmax
x
(p  c)
 
(x)1TBA>TAN
Z TBA
TAN
f()d
!
  x (15)
There are a couple of consequences. First, note that Proposition 3 also applies when investment
is unobservable, since the deviations suggested in its proof would not change the consumer behavior,
and, so, would not change the level of investment in equilibrium. Second, and perhaps more directly,
when investment is unobserved, if a rm chooses an opaque strategy, then sales do not depend on
investment (the right-hand side of Equation (15) is 0). As a consequence, the rm would not invest
and consumers would anticipate this, proving the following result.
Proposition 7 When investment is unobservable, opaque marketing (A = 1) is strictly optimal
only if there is no investment (x = 0).
This proposition is central to understanding the second mechanism described in the introduction.
It is at the heart of the idea that the marketing strategy is employed as a means of committing to
investment.
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Next, we prove a couple of results. The rst one compares di¤erent equilibria when investment
is not observable. The second compares the case where investment is observed to where it is not.
When the rms investment cannot be observed, in principle, there may be multiple equilibria.
For example, suppose that (x) = 0, and consider a set of parameters for which there exists an
equilibrium with positive quality investment and some consumers assessing. For this same case,
there also exists another equilibrium in which there is no investment: If consumers believe that
the rm makes no investment, they will be certain of a bad match; therefore, they would have no
reason to assess the good (even if it is costless to do so). Given this, the rm, indeed, has no reason
to investment.
The following result shows that taking the observed choices as xed, all consumers and the
rm agree on the ranking among multiple equilibria. This leads to a natural equilibrium selection
criterion: We assume that for a given price and marketing strategy, the equilibrium played is the
Pareto dominant one. This criterion is later used for the characterization and comparative statics
of Section 6.
Proposition 8 Given xed values of A and p, for any two equilibria with di¤erent investment
levels, there is one that Pareto dominates the other. That is, the equilibrium with higher prots is
also the one preferred by all consumers.
Proof. Suppose that there are two equilibria 1 and 2, and denote prots, quantity sold and
investment by i; Si and xi for i = 1; 2, respectively, with x1 > x2.
First, note that in equilibrium 1 a consumer could behave as in equilibrium 2, and achieve at
least the same utility as in equilibrium 2. Thus, given that x1 > x2, each consumer is at least as
well o¤ in equilibrium 1 as in equilibrium 2.
Second, note that S1  S2. The logic here is as follows: If a given type  assesses in equilibrium
2, then in equilibrium 1 she will either assess or buy without assessment; if she buys without
assessment in 2, then she would do the same in 1. In both cases, since x1 > x2 sales in 1 can be no
lower than sales in 2.
Finally, we show that 1  2. Suppose, for contradiction, that 2 > 1. Then, in equilibrium
1, given the assessment behavior of consumers described in the paragraph above, the rm would
have a protable deviation to invest x2. Sales under this deviation, SD, can be no lower than the
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sales in equilibrium 2: the investment is the same and consumers are more prone to assess and
buy. Therefore, deviation prots D = pSD   x2  pS2   x2 = 2 > 1, which provides the
contradiction.
Our nal result contrasts the case where investment is observed and where it is not.
Proposition 9 If transparent marketing (A = 0) is optimal for a rm when investment is observ-
able, then it is also optimal when investment is not observable.
Proof. When A = 0, consumer behavior is entirely determined by b(), g() and p. A consumer 
buys unconditionally if p < b(), buys conditionally if b() < p < g(); and never buys if p > g():
Thus, for a given p; when A = 0, consumer behavior is independent of the investment x:
Take the optimal choice (A = 0; p; x) by the rm when investment is observable. x is the
solution to the maximization of (p   c)S(x)   x; where S(x) is given by (7) evaluated at A = 0
and p. Note that when A = 0; given the above, TBA, TAN , and TBN do not depend on x. So,
one can easily see that this program is equivalent to the one in (15). It follows, therefore, that
(A = 0; p; x) is feasible when investment is unobservable, as well. Trivially, this is, then, the
solution to the unobservable investment case.
The main message of this section is that when quality investment is unobservable, the only
incentive of the rm to invest comes from the consumers that verify quality and buy conditionally.
This is suggestive that, compared to the case where the rm can commit to quality, the inability
to commit leads to higher transparency. Again, to fully characterize equilibrium and to run some
comparative statics, we use linear utility functions and a uniform distribution of consumer types.
6 The Linear-Uniform Case with Unobserved Investment
We can follow the analysis in Section 4 and, now, consider the case where consumers do not observe
investment. We use Proposition 8 to select the Pareto optimal equilibrium among the multiple ones
that may arise for a given choice of A and p (which are observed by all consumers and chosen by
the rm).
Recall that, for the linear-uniform case, we assume a simple investment function, whereby with
no investment a bad match is realized with certainty, but if the rm invests at cost k, the probability
of a good match is 12 . The condition that determines the investment level, Equation (15), yields
that there is investment if and only if
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(p  c)(TBA   TAN )1TBA>TAN  k (16)
That is, the rm invests only if the costs of doing so are smaller than the prots generated from
those consumers buying conditionally.
As in Section 4, when the rm makes no investment, it earns NI = maxf0; (b c+s)
2
4s ; b   cg.
Suppose that the rm invests in quality in equilibrium; following Proposition 7, it cannot be choosing
an opaque strategy. Thus, if the rm does invest, it does so while choosing either an intermediate
or a transparent marketing policy. As in Section 4, we can consider maximized prots under these
marketing strategies, recognizing that (16) may bind. We conduct this analysis in Appendix B, and
this allows us to compare these di¤erent strategies.
Comparing alternative marketing strategies. In parameter ranges in which the investment
incentive constraint (16) does not bind, all results must be identical to those in Section 4. Further,
the rst part of Proposition 6 (that the optimality of intermediate marketing requires s >> 0)
applies for a rm with unobservable investment. This is easily veried, since if s = 0, with interme-
diate marketing either T IntBA = 1 or T IntBA = T IntAN , both these outcomes suggest that intermediate
marketing cannot be optimal.
Outside of these parameter ranges, however, the remaining results need not be true. In partic-
ular, when  > 0, for example, at b = 1, g = 3, s = 2,  = 1, k = 0:2 and c = 0:1, it can be easily
veried that intermediate marketing is preferred.
Figure 3 illustrates optimal marketing strategies at the same parameter values as Figure 2 (b = 1,
g = 3,  =  0:5 and k = 0:2).
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Figure 3: Optimal investment and marketing strategies with unobservable investment.
Comparing the optimal strategies in the two gures, when investment is not observable, opaque
marketing is never optimal, as proven in Proposition 7. In the parameter region for which opaque
marketing is optimal when investment is observable, then under non-observable investment, both
transparent marketing and intermediate marketing can become optimal. In particular, for low
values of s and c (where the prot per unit earned is relatively high, so the IC condition is easier
to satisfy), intermediate marketing is preferred but for higher values of c, where the rm charges a
higher price and sells fewer units, it is more di¢ cult to satisfy (16) under intermediate marketing,
and transparent marketing is preferred.
7 Conclusions
We have presented a simple framework in which marketing strategies interact with quality provision
and pricing policies in an environment where agents need to exert e¤ort to learn their valuation of
a good and are heterogeneous in their tastes. Marketing strategies are modeled in a reduced form
in which the rm can make it more or less di¢ cult for consumers to learn their true valuation for
the good. Quality provision is modeled as a productive e¤ort that improves the probability of a
good match between consumers and the good.
20
While a rst intuition might be that releasing more information should increase rm prots, a
deeper reection shows that this might not be the case. The main force at work is whether the
rm prefers to provide little information and have a low markup with a high volume of sales or to
provide more information and have a high markup with lower sales to a selected niche of consumers.
If the rm provides little information that is, if it is too costly for consumers to know their true
valuation for the good it may sell to all consumers at a low price. Meanwhile, if the rm provides
cheap information, consumers learn whether they would enjoy the good, and the rm may charge
a high price and sell only to those encountering a high valuation.
With heterogeneous consumers, the rm may decide on an intermediate marketing strategy to
sort di¤erent types of consumers into di¤erent regimes. This may happen even when, in isolation,
each consumer would face the same extreme marketing. Summarizing, we show that both infor-
mative advertising and obfuscation strategies can be the result of optimal behavior by rms and,
further, that extreme marketing strategies may not always be optimal. The interior marketing strat-
egy can be considered as a (non-price) means of discriminating between consumers, as suggested in
Proposition 3.
In addition to this trade-o¤ of quantity vs. markup, if the rm cannot publicly commit to
providing high quality, a further e¤ect is at work, as highlighted in Proposition 7. Here, a way to
indirectly commit to quality is to choose a su¢ ciently transparent policy that induces consumer
assessment and disciplines the rm. In particular, there are cases with intermediate marketing
in which some consumers verify the quality of the good and buy conditionally, while others buy
unconditionally. In this case, there is an externality at work: The consumers that verify the quality
of the good force the rm to exert e¤ort in quality provision that also benets consumers who buy
unconditionally.
The paper has considered a monopoly provider. In a competitive market, information provision
plays an additional role it softens price competition by creating some product di¤erentiation,
as in Meuer and Stahl (1994) and Hotz and Xiao (2007). Therefore, this di¤erentiation motive
pushes towards more transparent marketing policies. However, and particularly if rms o¤er ex-
ante di¤erentiated products, the e¤ects highlighted in this paper should still play a role. A full
analysis of these issues lies outside the scope of this paper.
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A Opacity and Transparency in the Linear-Uniform Case with Observ-
able Investment
Here, we characterize the optimal pricing strategies and prots under the assumption that the rm invests,
rst in the case that the rm chooses opaque marketing, and, next, transparent marketing.
A.1 Opaque marketing
Under opaque marketing (A = 1), we have that TAN = 1 and TBA = 0: Thus, the rms prots from
Equation (9) can be rewritten as
Op = (p  c)(1  TBN )  k. (17)
where TBN = max(min( 2p g b2s+ ; 1); 0). Maximizing this expression with respect to p, leads to either a
TBN -interior optimal price of pOp =
b+g++2(c+s)
4
(and prots of Op =
(b+g+2(s c)+)2
2(2s+)
  k), or a corner
T ;OpBN = 0 solution with p

Op =
g+b
2
(and prots of Op =
g+b
2
 c k). Note that a corner TBN = 1 solution
is always suboptimal, as no sales are realized, but a k investment cost is incurred.
A.2 Transparent marketing
Under transparent marketing (A = 0), TBA  TBN  TAN , which simplies the rms prots from Equation
(9) to:
Tr = (p  c)

(1  TBA) + 1
2
(TBA   TAN )

  k (18)
where TAN = max(min( p gs+ ; 1); 0) and TBA = max(min(
p b
s
; 1); 0). As one can see, sales are a piecewise
linear function of p. Thus, the optimal price expression di¤ers depending on which part of the piecewise
function is the relevant one.
First, we consider the cases in which the price is such that no consumer is excluded (TAN = 0): Choosing
p  b and selling regardless of the realization cannot be optimal, as the rm would prefer then not to invest
in quality at all. Next, if the optimal price is such that TBA 2 (0; 1); then prots can be written as
(p   c) 1  p b
2s
   k, the maximization problem yields Tr = (b c+2s)28s   k, an this happens as long as
b < pTr =
b+c+2s
2
< minfg; b + sg. Finally, the rm can choose p = g, selling only in the case of a good
match-realization, and earning Tr = g c2   k.
Alternatively, the rm can choose a price that excludes some consumers (TAN > 0). In the region
where TBA < 1, prots are given by (p  c)
h
1  1
2
p b
s
  1
2
p g
s+
i
: Maximizing with respect to p yields
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pTr =
1
2
(b+c+2s)+s(b+g+2c+2s)
2s+
and prots of Tr =
((b c+2s)+s(b+g 2c+2s))2
8s(s+)(2s+)
  k: This case requires
pTr 2 (g;minfb+s; g+s+g). Finally, we consider the case with TBA = 1: Prots are (p  c) 12 (1  p gs+ ) k,
which are maximized at pTr =
c+s+g+
2
the maximization in this case yields Tr =
(g c+s+)2
8(s+)
  k so long
as maxfg; b+ sg < pTr = c+s+g+2 < g + s.
B Intermediate and Transparent Marketing in the Linear-Uniform Case
with Unobservable Investment
B.1 Intermediate marketing
Following Proposition 3, an optimal intermediate marketing strategy requires 1 > TBA > TAN  0: As in
Section 4, we can use Equation (13) to express prots:
Int = (p  c)

1  p  b  2A
s
+
1
2

p  b  2A
s
 max(2A  g + p
s+
; 0)

  k. (19)
However, here the rm faces the additional constraint stated in (16):
(p  c)

p  b  2A
s
 max(2A  g + p
s+
; 0)

> 2k. (20)
Note that the left-hand side of this constraint is linear and decreasing in A. There are a number of
possibilities to be considered.
First, Equation (20) might not be binding; then, the analysis of Section 4 applies and so the rm
would choose A = g p
2
, pInt =
2(s+c)+b+g
4
and maximized prots would be Int =
(b+g+2(s c))2
16s
. Note
that the feasibility of this solution requires 1 > T ;IntBA =
2(s+c) b g
4s
> 0 and the new constraint that
4s2 (b+g 2c)2
16s
> k.
Alternatively, Equation (20) might bind. Here, there are two cases depending, on whether g p
2
? A:
In the case that g p
2
< A; solving for A as a function of p when (20) binds (and no other condition
binds) substituting into the prot function and simplifying, we can obtain pInt =
2(c+s)++B+G
4
, Int =
1
8
(b+g 2c+2s+)2
2s+
  
2s+
k and A = 1
2
(p b)+(g b)s
2s+
  s(s+)
(p c)(2s+)k. Note that we also require that 1 >
TBA > TAN  0, which can be written as:
1 > TBA =
1
2
2c+2s+ b g
2s+
+ 8(s+)
(2s+)(b+g 2c+2s+)k >
1
2
2c+2s+ b g
2s+
  8s
(2s+)(b+g 2c+2s+)k  0.
A nal case is that (20) binds and that TAN = 0, which requires that g p2 > A. In this case, when (20)
binds, p c
2
TBA = k, and so TBA = 2kp c and (substituting in for TBA) A =
p b
2
  sk
p c . Substituting into the
prot function, we obtain (p  c)(1  2k
p c +
k
p c ), and so the rm sets the price as high as possible, subject
to constraints. Thus, the new constraintTAN  0 binds and we require g p2 = A, which yields the two
solutions p = 1
4
(b + g + c pb2   4bc+ 2bg + 4c2   4cg + g2 + 16ks). One can substitute back to obtain
maximized prots in this case.
B.2 Transparent marketing
The solutions computed in Appendix A.2 are also the solutions here, because, as the proof of Proposition
9 shows, they also satisfy the incentive-compatibility constraint.
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